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In this paper I apply the Hamiltonian method to solve the relaxed multi-
dimensional screening problem. I also i l l u s t r a t eb ys o m ee x a m p l e st h a tt h e
Hamiltonian technique coupled with implementability criterion developed by
Carlier [2002] sometimes allows us to arrive at a complete solution of a screen-
ing problem.1I N T R O D U C T I O N
In many industries the tariﬀs are not strictly proportional to the quantity
purchased. Examples include railroad tariﬀs, electricity tariﬀs, and rental
rates for durable goods and space. All these cases fall into a general category
of nonlinear tariﬀs. The major justiﬁcation for the nonlinear pricing is the
existence of private information on the side of consumers. In the early papers
on the subject, private information was captured either by assuming a ﬁnite
number of types [e. g. Adams and Yellen, 1976] or by a one-dimensional con-
tinuum of types [Mussa and Rosen, 1978]. However, often nonlinear tariﬀs
specify the payment as a function of a variety of characteristics. For exam-
ple, railroad tariﬀs specify charges based on weight, volume, and distance of
each shipment. Diﬀerent customers may value each of these characteristics
diﬀerently, hence the customer’s type will not in general be captured by a
one-dimensional characteristic and a problem of multi-dimensional screening
arises.
The general formulation of the problem of multi-dimensional screening is
due to Armstrong [1996] and Wilson [1993], and goes as follows. Consider
a multi-product monopoly producing n goods with a convex cost function.
The preferences of a consumer over these goods can be parameterized by
1an m−dimensional vector. Types of consumers are distributed according to
a density function f(·) deﬁned over a convex open bounded set Ω ⊂ Rm.
Assume that f(·) is continuously diﬀerentiable on Ω and can be extended by
continuity on its closure. The monopolist is interested in maximizing proﬁts
b yc h o o s i n gat a r i ﬀ which is a function from the set of bundles of goods to
the real line. The tariﬀ determines how much a consumer will pay for a
particular bundle of goods.
Armstrong [1996] formulated the problem for arbitrary m and n and de-
rived a solution in some special cases. He assumed that the preferences of
consumers are given by a utility function which is increasing in all argu-
ments, and that is continuous, convex, and homogeneous of degree one in
tastes. Under rather strong assumptions both on the utility function and
the distribution over types, he showed that the optimal tariﬀ is cost-based.
Armstrong [1999] gave an approximate solution when the number of goods is
large. He showed that in this case the optimal tariﬀ c a nb ea p p r o x i m a t e db y
a two-part tariﬀ when taste parameters are distributed independently across
products, and a menu of two-part tariﬀs when there is a correlation in the
distribution of types.
Rochet and Chone [1998] developed a general technique for dealing with
2the problem of multidimensional screening when n = m and utilities are lin-
ear in types. Their technique was extended to the case m 6= n by Basov
[2001]. The last paper uses the Hamiltonian approach to solve the screening
problem. In this paper I use the Hamiltonian approach for a partial charac-
terization of the solution of multi-dimensional screening models with utilities
nonlinear in types.
Following the strategy developed by Rochet and Chone [1998], I ﬁrst
deal with the relaxed problem, i.e. with the screening problem in which the
implementability constraint is dropped. This is a standard optimal control
problem and hence, it can be solved using the technique described in Basov
[2001]. Recent results obtained by Carlier [2002] allow us to check whether
the obtained solution is implementable. Their criterion is based on a gen-
eralized notion of convexity and will be described below. If the criterion is
satisﬁed the derived allocation is implementable
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I describe the general
implementability result of Carlier and give a simpler and economically more
transparent proof than the original paper. I also show that in the linear
context the general implementability criterion is reduced to the requirement
that the surplus is convex, while in the one-dimensional model satisfying
3the single crossing property it is reduced to the demand that the allocation
is increasing in type. Both these cases were studied in the literature, see
Mussa and Rosen [1978] for the one-dimensional case and Rochet [1987] for
the general linear case. In Section 3 I formulate the relaxed problem and
obtain the ﬁrst order characterization of the solution. I also show that if the
solution to the relaxed problem is implementable and dimensionality of the
types space is odd, under some weak assumptions on the types space there
exist at least two types on the boundary of the participation region that are
served eﬃciently. In Section 4 I apply the developed technique to solve some
examples.
2 THE IMPLEMENTABILITY CRITERION
Assume that the preferences of a consumer of type α who purchases one
unit of good with quality characteristics x ∈ Rn
+ and pays t ∈ R are given
by a utility function
u(α,x,t)=v(α,x) − t.
4Here α ∈ Ω,w h e r eΩ is an open, bounded, simply connected1 subset of Rm
with a piece-wise smooth boundary, and v is a diﬀerentiable function of its
arguments. The type is private information of the consumer, however, it is
c o m m o nk n o w l e d g et h a tt y p e sa r ed i s t r i b u t e da c c o r d i n gt oa ne v e r y w h e r e
positive density function f(α).
The monopolist’s problem is to derive a tariﬀ t2: Rn




[t(x(α)) − c(x(α))]f(α)dα (1)
where c(·) is the cost of production and x(α) is the bundle purchased by all
type−α consumers.





Thus, s(α) is the surplus of a consumer of type α w h oc h o o s e sab u n d l e
x ∈ X that maximizes her utility. One can solve (1), (2) to get:
1A set is called simply connected if all its homotopy groups are trivial. For example,
any convex set is simply connected.
2Restricting the monopolist to devising a tariﬀ rather then a more general allocation
scheme is without loss of generality. See, for example, Rochet [1985].
5t(α)=v(α,x) − s(α). (3)
It is important to note that the function t(·),d e ﬁned by (3), depends on α
only through x. More precisely, assume there exist two types α1 and α2 such
that x(α1)=x(α2),b u tt1 6= t2, where ti ≡ t(αi). Without loss of generality,
assume that t1 >t 2.B u tt h e nt y p eα1 would be better-oﬀ choosing x(α2) and
paying t2, which contradicts the utility maximization by type α1. This means
that the function t(·) deﬁn e di n( 3 )i si n d e e dat a r i ﬀ, since it maps bundles of
goods into the real line. It is possible to show that s(·) is continuous, almost






(α,x(α)),i = 1,m. (4)
For a proof see Carlier [2001]. This implies that the optimal tariﬀ will be
continuous, therefore the monopolist can without loss of generality restrict
her attention to the continuous tariﬀs. Hence, I will call an allocation x(α)
implementable if there exists a continuous tariﬀ t : Rn
+ → R such that




6Consider an allocation x(α) and surplus function s(α) such that the envelope
conditions
∇s(α)=∇αu(α,x(α)).
are satisﬁed almost everywhere. Allocation rule x(α) is in general a corre-
spondence. We assume that this correspondence is upper-hemicontinuous,
which will always be the case if consumers face a continuos tariﬀ.L e t
X = x(Ω),t h e ns i n c ex(·) is u.h.c. and Ω is compact, X is compact.
One might ask: Given a surplus function and an allocation satisfying the
envelope conditions (4) does there exist a tariﬀ that implements them? It
turns out that the answer to this question is aﬃrmative if and only if the
consumer surplus satisﬁes a generalized convexity property3. This result was
ﬁrst proved by Carlier [2002]. For the sake of completeness I will give the
basic deﬁnitions and the proof of the result. The form in which the result is
formulated here and its proof diﬀer from that given in Carlier [2002].





3For a more detailed discussion of abstract convexity see, for example, Singer [1997]
7is called v−conjugate of s(α).






is called v−biconjugate of s(α).
Deﬁnition v(α,x) is said to satisfy the generalized single-crossing (GSC)
property if
[∇αv(α,x1)=∇αv(α,x2)] ⇒ (x1 = x2).
Theorem 1 Assume v(α,x) is continuous in both arguments, continuously
diﬀerentiable in α and satisﬁes GSC. An allocation x(α) and surplus s(α)
are implementable if and only if the following conditions hold:
a. s(α) is continuos and almost everywhere diﬀerentiable;
b. x(α) is upper hemicontinuous and the envelope condition holds almost
everywhere;
c. s(α)=s∗∗(α).





s∗(x), for x ∈ X
∞, for x ∈ Rn
+/X.
Condition (c) implies that this tariﬀ will implement the surplus s(α) and an
allocation
h(α)=a r gm a x
x∈X
(v(α,x) − t(x)).
B yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m
∇s(α)=∇αv(α,h(α)).
The GSC property now implies that h(α)=x(α).
Now suppose that s(α) and x(α) are implementable. Then there exists
continuous t : Rn









Condition (a) now follows from the Berge maximum theorem, while Condi-
9tion (b) follows from the envelope theorem. To prove Condition (c) note that









On the other hand, for any β ∈ Ω
t(x) ≥ v(β,x) − s(β).
Hence, for any x ∈ X
t(x)=m a x
α∈Ω
(v(α,x) − s(α)) = s
∗(x).
The tariﬀ is not determined uniquely outside X.I t i s s u ﬃcient to choose








Note that the GSC property was used only in the proof of the suﬃciency
in the previous theorem. Hence, Conditions (a)-(c) are necessary even if GSC
is not satisﬁed. Theorem 1 can be reformulated in a way that gets rid of GSC
completely. Namely: An allocation x(α) and surplus s(α) are implementable





s∗(x), for x ∈ X
∞, for x ∈ Rn
+/X.
H o w e v e r ,i fG S Cd o e sn o th o l dt h et a r i ﬀ may implement allocation x(α)
only weakly, namely the optimal choice of a consumer given the tariﬀ need
not be unique. Moreover, there may be several diﬀerent tariﬀs implementing
the same surplus function. To appreciate these points consider the following
example.
11Example 1. Let m =1 ,n=2 . Assume that consumers’ utilities are given
by
v(α,x1,x 2)=α(x1 + x2),









Assume that Ω =[ 0 ,1] and types are distributed uniformly on Ω.N o t et h a t






(α,y) ⇔ x1 + x2 = y1 + y2 ; x = y.
To ﬁnd the optimal allocation, following Basov (2001), ﬁrst solve
minc(x1,x 2)
s.t. x1 + x2 = y.
12The result is


























y(α)=4 α − 2
and
x1(α)=x2(α)=2 α − 1.
Types with α<1/2 are excluded from the contract. Not that this allocation

















(x1 + x2 +2 ) 2
4
− 1).
The last tariﬀ implements the above allocation only weakly, since any pair
(x1,x 2) satisfying
x1 + x2 =4 α − 2
is an optimal choice for a consumer of type α given the tariﬀ.





Theorem 1 implies that a surplus is implementable if and only if it is convex.
This result was ﬁrst obtained in Rochet (1987). Moreover, the optimal tariﬀ
is convex.
The practical use of Theorem 1 is that to check whether a surplus is imple-
mentable by any tariﬀ it is suﬃcient to check whether it is implementable by
ap a r t i c u l a rtariﬀ,n a m e l yb yt h ev−conjugate of the surplus. I demonstrate
this point in the following two examples.
14Example 2.




Is surplus ψ(α)=α implementable? According to Theorem 1 it is suﬃcient








4(1−x1),x 1 < 1














and the value of the maximum is α. Hence the surplus is implementable.
15Example 3.
Assume Ω =( 0 ,1) and
v(α,x)=αx1 + α
3/2x2.
Is surplus ψ(α)=α implementable? According to Theorem 1 it is suﬃcient






x2, if 2x1 +3 x2 ≥ 2






3/2x2 − t(x)) = ∞.
Hence, the surplus is not implementable.












Note that these problems are dual in the sense that the ﬁrst order conditions
for one of them are the envelope conditions for the other. Assume that
functions v(·,·) and s(·) and set Ω are such that the ﬁrst order conditions are
necessary and suﬃcient for each maximization problem (e.g. v(·,·) is concave
in α and linear in x, s(·) is convex and set Ω is convex). Then s∗∗ = s and
s(·) is implementable.
Now let us consider the case when m = n =1 . Assume that Ω =( 0 ,1),
function v(·,·) is twice diﬀerentiable with v1 ≥ 0,v 2 ≥ 0 and v12 > 0, where
vi denotes the partial derivative with respect to the ith argument. Moreover,
v(0,0) = v2(0,0) = 0.I n e q u a l i t y v12 > 0 is known as the single crossing
property. The following result holds:
Corollary 1. Assume a consumer has a twice diﬀerentiable utility function
satisfying the single crossing property. Given a diﬀerentiable function s(·)
deﬁne x = h(α) as the unique solution to
s
0(α)=v1(α,x).( 6 )
17Then s(·)=s∗∗(·) (and therefore implementable) if and only if h(α) is weakly
increasing.
This result was ﬁrst obtained by Mussa and Rosen (1978). Here I want to
prove it as a corollary of the general implementability theorem. Note that
even in the case m = n =1Theorem 1 is stronger then Corollary 1 since it
does not require the single-crossing property to hold.
Proof. First, suppose that h(α) is weakly increasing. We have to prove that
s(·) is v−convex. Deﬁne a correspondence h−1(x) by
α ∈ h
−1(x) ⇔ h(α)=x. (7)
This correspondence is increasing, namely x1 >x 2, α1 ∈ h(x1),α 2 ∈ h(x2)
implies x1 >x 2. I will write α<h −1(x) (α>h −1(x))i ff o r∀β ∈ h−1(x)
α<β(α>β ). It is easy to see that h−1(x) is either singleton or a closed




(v(α,x) − s(α)). (8)
Let




0(α)=v1(α,x) − v1(α,h(α)).( 1 0 )
The last equality follows from the deﬁnition of h(α).L e tα<h −1(x).T h e n
x>h (α) and by the single crossing property v1(α,x) >v 1(α,h(α)) and
ψ
0(α) > 0. Similar, if α>h −1(x) then ψ
0(α) < 0. Finally, if α ∈ h(x) then
(9) implies ψ
0(α)=0 . Hence function ψ(α) is maximized at α ∈ h(x) (all





A c c o r d i n gt o( 9 ) ,t h ev a l u eo fs∗(x) does not depend on the selection from




−1(x),x).( 1 2 )
If h−1(x) is a singleton then s∗0(x) is well deﬁned. If it is an interval, s∗0(x)
will be multivalued (and correspond to the sub-diﬀerential rather then to a
derivative). In this case s∗0(x) will have a kink.
Now deﬁne
s











Using the single crossing property in the same way as above, it is easy to
see that ϕ(x) is increasing for x<h (α) and decreasing afterwards. Hence, a




−1(h(α))) = s(α).( 1 6 )











The generalized envelope theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002) implies that
s0(α)=v1(α,x∗). Hence by the single crossing property x∗ = h(α).
According to the Revelation Principle (see, for example, Mas-Colel, Whin-
ston, and Green, 1995) the same allocation can be implemented by a direct
revelation mechanism. That is, the consumer is asked to reveal her type. If





The last expression follows from the deﬁnition of the surplus and envelope
conditions (4). It should be optimal for the consumer to reveal her type
truthfully.





0).( 2 0 )




∂α02(α,α) ≤ 0. (21)
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order condition with respect to α0 along the line
α0 = α and taking into account the second order condition implies
∂2V
∂α∂α0(α,α) ≥ 0. (22)




Hence, taking into account the single-crossing property, h0(α) ≥ 0.
In this Section I described Carlier’s general implementability Theorem
and showed that previously known results on implementability can be ob-
tained as its corollaries. In the next Section I will drop the implementability
22constraint and formulate the relaxed problem.
3 THE RELAXED PROBLEM
Recall that the monopolist’s problem is to derive a tariﬀ t : Rn
+ → R to
maximize proﬁts (1) subject to




Using (3) to exclude the tariﬀ from the monopolist’s objective the monopo-











(α,x),i = 1,m, s
∗∗(α)=s(α),s (α) ≥ s0(α). (26)
The constraints include envelope conditions (4), a participation constraint,
and the implementability condition provided by Theorem 1. Function s0(α)
gives the value of the outside option for a consumer of type α. One might one
to assume that s∗∗
0 (α)=s0(α). The economic meaning of this assumption
is that s0(α) itself results from participation in some economic mechanism.
23This assumption, however, is not important for our purposes. Carlier (2001)
proved that the problem (25)-(26) has a solution.




(α,x(α)),i = 1,m− n (27)
zi = xi,i = m − n +1 ,n.( 2 8 )















(α,z),i = 1,m− n (31)
The relaxed problem (29)-(31) is obtained from the problem (25)-(26) by
dropping the implementability constraint and using (27)-(28) to exclude x.
It is an optimal control problem with a state variable s and a vector of
control variables z. Note that there are two types of constraints that govern
this problem: constraints (30) link controls with the partial derivatives of the
state variable. They are similar to the capital accumulation equation in the
24optimal growth theory. Constraints (31), on the other hand, restrict the set
of possible controls and do not contain the state variable or its derivatives.
Note that if m ≤ n constraints (31) vanish.
Suppose function v is linear in type and ∂v/∂αi = xi,i= m − n +1 ,n.
In that case components of vector z c a nb ev i e w e da sa r t i ﬁcial goods, utils,
which are produced from physical goods, x using production technology (27)-
(28). If m>nnot all util combinations can be produced, i. e. there are
production constraints. Hence, a multidimensional screening problem with
m>nis equivalent to a screening problem with m = n with production
constraints. A similar interpretation can be useful in the nonlinear case.
In that case, however, both utils and production constraints become type
speciﬁc.
Theorem 2 Suppose there exists γ>0 such that f(α) ≥ γ for any α ∈ Ω.
Let function ∂v/∂αi(α,·):Rn
+ → R be twice continuously diﬀerentiable and
concave and c(·) be twice continuously diﬀerentiable and the matrix of its
second derivatives B = D2c has uniformly bounded eigenvalues, i. e. ∃ε>0
25and ∃M>εsuch that ∀x ∈ Rn
+ and ∀h ∈ Rn
εkhk
2 ≤ hh,Bhi ≤ M khk
2 .
Then problem (29)-(32) has a unique solution.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that, as we have seen in Example 1, the uniqueness of surplus guar-
anteed by Theorem 2 does not imply the uniqueness of the optimal tariﬀ,
unless the GSC property holds.
This Theorem generalizes similar results in Rochet and Chone [1998] and
Basov [2001] for a nonlinear case. Note that this result does not follow from
t h er e s u l t so b t a i n e db yC a r l i e r[ 2 0 0 1 ] ,s i n c eh ed o e sn o td e a lw i t ht h er e l a x e d
problem. Our next step is to provide the ﬁrst order characterization of the
solution of the problem (29)-(31).







s.t. Aϕ = b(y,t),g (y,t)=0 ,ϕ (t) ≥ ϕ0(t) (33)
where t ∈ Ω ⊂ Rm is an open, bounded, one-connected set with a smooth
boundary, ϕ : Ω → R and each component of y : Ω → Rn
+ belongs to
H1(Ω), A : H1(Ω) → ×m
i=1H0(Ω) ≡ H0
m(Ω) is a linear diﬀerential operator,
b : Rn+m → Rm and g : Rn+m → R  are continuously diﬀerentiable functions,
and ϕ0 : Ω → R is a continuous function. Here Hp(Ω) is the pth Sobolev
space, i. e. the space of functions possessing square integrable derivatives up
to the order p, H
p
k(Ω) is the space of k−dimensional vector functions, such
that each component belongs to Hp(Ω). For any two functions ζ,ξ ∈ H0
m(Ω)








27Let ν(α) denote the unit vector normal to the boundary ∂Ω of the set Ω
and pointing in the outward direction.
Deﬁnition 5. Operator A∗ : H1
m(Ω) → H0(Ω) is called adjoint for the
operator A if for any ζ ∈ H1(Ω) and ξ ∈ H1
m(Ω) such that hξ,νi =0
(ξ,Aζ)=( A
∗ξ,ζ). (35)
To formulate the ﬁrst order conditions for the problem (35)-(36) form a
Hamiltonian:
H(ϕ,y,t;λ,µ)=F(ϕ,y,t)+hλ,∇αv(α,z)i + hµ,g(y,t)i + η(ϕ(t) − ϕ0(t)).
(36)
where λ : Ω → Rm and µ : Ω → R  are continuously diﬀerentiable vector
functions. Then the following result holds.5
Theorem 3 Suppose function ϕ(·) solves the problem (32)-(33). Let Γ be the
5For a discussion, see Eberhard [1984] or Funk [1962].
28set {t ∈ Ω : ϕ(t) ≥ ϕ0(t)}. Then there exist continuously diﬀerentiable vector






a.e. on Γ.( 3 7 )
hλ,νi =0 a.e. on ∂Γ ∩ ∂Ω.( 3 8 )
η(ϕ(t) − ϕ0(t)) = 0 (39)
y ∈ argmaxH(ϕ,y,t;λ,µ). (40)
Equation (37) governs the evolution of the costate vector λ.I ti se a s yt o
see that if m =1and A = d/dt then (37) is reduced to6




This condition is well known to economists from optimal growth theory.
Equation (38) is a straightforward generalization of the transversality condi-
tion, (39) is the complementary slackness condition. Finally, equation (40)
is Pontryagin’s maximum principle.
6In this case Ω =[ 0 ,T] and ingegrating and taking into account ξ(T)=0one obtains R T
0 ζ(t)˙ ζ(t)dt = −
R T
0
˙ ζ(t)ξ(t)dt. Hence (d/dt)∗ = −(d/dt).
293.2 THE FIRST ORDER CHARACTERIZATION OF
THE SOLUTION TO THE RELAXED PROB-
LEM
After a short recourse in the optimal control theory we are ready to
provide the ﬁrst order characterization of the solution to the relaxed problem.
Deﬁne the Hamiltonian by












Recall that for a continuously diﬀerentiable vector function q : Rm → Rm







The following result holds:
30Theorem 4 Suppose the surplus function s∗(·) solves the problem (29)-(31).
Then there exist continuously diﬀerentiable vector functions λ : Ω → Rm,
µ : Ω → Rm−n, and a continuos function η : Ω → R+ and continuous almost
everywhere diﬀerentiable function s(·) such that s∗(α)=m a x ( s(α),s 0(α))




a.e. on Ω. (45)
hλ,νi =0 a.e. ∂Ω.( 4 6 )
η ≥ 0 (47)
η(s(α) − s0(t)) = 0 (48)
z ∈ argmaxH(s,z,α;λ,µ). (49)





where A = ∇ i st h eg r a d i e n to p e r a t o r . T oﬁnd its adjoint take arbitrary
31continuously diﬀerentiable function ξ : Ω → Ω satisfying
hξ,νi =0 (51)










div(ζξ)=ξ∇ζ + ζdivξ.( 5 3 )









ζdivξdα.( 5 4 )
Due to (51), the ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (55) vanishes and we
obtain ∇
∗ = −div. Now Theorem 4 follows from Theorem 3.
Q.E.D.






Assume that functions vi(·) are twice continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly
quasiconcave, the Jacoby matrix Dv(x) has a full rank for all x ∈ Rn
+, vi(0) =





for ∀x ∈ Rn
+. Let the cost function be increasing, convex, twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, and the eigenvalues of the matrix of its second derivatives are
uniformly bounded from above and are uniformly bounded away from zero
from below.
First, consider the problem:
minc(x) (55)
s.t. vi(x) ≥ vi,i =1 ,...,n. (56)
Given the assumptions, the solution exists and is unique. Denote this
33solution by x∗(v) and deﬁne θ(v)=c(x∗(v)).T h e nθ(v) will be convex, twice
continuously diﬀerentiable, and the eigenvalues of the matrix of its second
derivatives will be uniformly bounded from above and uniformly bounded
away from zero from below. Now, the monopolist’s problem (25)-(31) can be














(α,z),i = 1,m, s≥ s0(α). (58)
It is straightforward to check that the ﬁrst order conditions to problem (57)-
(60) are equivalent to (48)-(51). Characterization (57)-(60) for the linear
case was found earlier by Basov (2001).
3.3 SOME PROPERTIES OF THE SOLUTION WHEN
THE IMPLEMENTABILITY CONSTRAINT DOES
NOT BIND
Assume that the implementability constraint does not bind, that is the
solution to the relaxed problem found in the previous subsection is imple-
34mentable. In this case we can establish some interesting properties of the




= f(α) − η(α)




Condition (47) implies that η(·) is a probability density function, call the
probability measure induced by this density µ. The complimentary slackness
condition (48) implies that the support of µ is Ω0.M o r e o v e r ,µ is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesque measure on Ω0 and µ(Ω0)=1 .T h i s
result generalizes a similar ﬁnding by Rochet and Chone [1998]. In the linear
context Rochet and Chone were able to show that this result still holds for the
solution of the complete problem. Whether this is still true in the nonlinear
case is unknown. Another interesting result is that if m>1 is odd, there
exist at least two types on the boundary of the participation region that are
served eﬃciently. The result is summarized in the following lemma.
35Lemma 1 Assume that Ω is convex, v(α,x) is convex in types, m is odd,
and s0(α)=0 . Moreover, assume that the solution to the relaxed problem
is implementable. Then there are at least two types on the boundary of the
participation region that are served eﬃciently under the optimal mechanism.
Proof. F i r s tn o t et h a ti ti ss u ﬃcient to prove that there are at least two
points α1,α 2 ∈ ∂Γ such that λ(α1)=λ(α1)=0 . Indeed, at these points
the Pontryagin maximum principle (49) implies that the social surplus is
maximized. To show that such points exist, note that our assumptions on Ω
imply that ∂Ω is topologically equivalent to a sphere of dimension (m − 1).
Our assumptions on utility imply that s(α) is convex, hence the exclusion
region is convex. Deﬁne mapping ϕ : ∂Ω → ∂Γ as follows. Let γ = ∂Ω∩∂Γ,
select O/ ∈ Ω to be the vertex of the cone with base γ and draw a straight
line through O and a point X ∈ ∂Ω. Assume, X/ ∈ γ.S i n c e Ω is convex,
there exists unique Y 6= X such that Y ∈ ∂Ω∩(OX). Since, Ω/Γ is convex,
there exists unique Z 6= Y such that Y ∈ ∂Γ ∩ (OX).D e ﬁne ϕ(X)=X if
either X ∈ γ or Z lies between X and Y .O t h e r w i s e ,d e ﬁne ϕ(X)=Z.I ti s
straightforward to check that ϕ is a homeomorphism. Therefore, ∂Γ will be
topologically equivalent to a sphere of dimension (m−1).I fm is odd, m−1
36is even and the Euler characteristic of the sphere will be equal to 2. Hence,
there exist at least two points on ∂Γ at which a continuos vector ﬁeld λ will
become zero, and the corresponding types will be served eﬃciently.
Q. E. D.
4 APPLICATION OF THE DEVELOPED TECH-
NIQUE
In this Section I am going to apply the developed technique to solve a
particular example. I will consider a market for a good with one quality char-
acteristic with two-dimensional private information. The example is similar
to Laﬀont, Maskin, and Rochet [1987], where both the demand slope and
demand intercept were private information. Unlike the latter case, however,
in my example the market collapses completely, that is nobody is served in
equilibrium.
Example 4. Assume that consumers are interested in buying a single unit
of a good. If a consumer of type α ∈ (0,1)×(0,1) pays t for a good of quality
37x she obtains utility
u(α,x,t)=α1(x − α2)
2 − t.( 5 9 )
Assume that the types are distributed uniformly on the unit square and the





Note that under perfect information all types with α1 > 1/2 should be served
a n do b t a i na ni n ﬁnite quality. That is potential gains to trade are inﬁnite.
However, as we will see, due to the private information the market fails
completely.










s.t.s1 = z1,s 2 =2 α1(α2 − z2),z 1 − (z2 − α2)
2 =0 ,s ≥ 0. (62)
Here I assume that the outside option is the same for all consumers and is







Conditions (48)-(51) are reduced to the boundary value problem for the sys-






























39Deﬁne tariﬀ t(·) by







It is straightforward to check that tariﬀ (72) implements allocation (71) (in
doing so one should take into account the non-negativity constraint x ≥ 0).
Hence, the solution to the relaxed problem is also a solution for the original
problem. Nobody is served in equilibrium and the market fails completely.
Note also that this tariﬀ is not unique. For example, t(x)=2 x2 will do the
job. As we saw in Section 2 the tariﬀ is determined uniquely only on set X,
which in this case is {0}.
Example 5. Let the individual’s utility be given by:
u(α,x,t)=α1x1 + α2x2 +
√
α1α2x3 − t











40The set Ω = {α ∈ R2
+ : α1 + α2 <b }. Distribution of types is given by
f(α1,α 2)=
exp(−α1 − α2)
1 − (b +1 )e x p ( −b)
.
The value of the outside option is type independent and normalized to be
zero.
I will show that in the case β =1 /2 the optimal tariﬀ is cost based. In this
particular case the solution can be found in three diﬀerent ways: reducing
the problem to the one-dimensional one, using integration by rays technique
(Armstrong, 1996) and using the Hamiltonian approach. We will see that the
solution to the relaxed problem is implementable in this case. Of course, the
results of all three approaches agree. If β 6=1 /2 the optimal tariﬀ is no longer
cost based, hence the problem is no longer reducable to a one-dimensional
one. Moreover, the candidate solution obtained using integration by rays
technique is no longer implementable. One can still write the ﬁrst order
conditions for the Hamiltonian approach. They can be reduced to a von-
Neumann boundary value problem for an elliptic partial diﬀerential equation
on consumer surplus. Moreover, for β suﬃciently close 1/2 the solution to
41this problem is implementable. However, it cannot be found analytically in
ac l o s e df o r m .




















































F o l l o w i n gA r m s t r o n g( 1 9 9 6 )w ec o n c l u d et h a tt h eo p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ is cost based
if and only if u(α,y)=v(y)ϕ(α1 + α2) which happens for β =1 /2. Let us
42concentrate on case β =1 /2 for a while.
1. Reduction of the Problem to a One-Dimensional One Using Cost-Based
Tariﬀs.
The optimal tariﬀ is cost based and for a given tariﬀ t(y) the consumer
surplus is
s(α)=m a x ( ( α1 + α2)
p
2y − t(y)).







2y − s(α1 + α2) − y)exp(−α1 − α2)dα1dα2,
where integration is over the triangle Ω = {α ∈ R2
+ : α1 + α2 < 1}.M a k ea
























43where I dropped subscript 1 to simplify notation. Using standard integra-
tion by parts technique (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) it can be shown that the











1 − (b +1 )e x p ( −b)
and H(γ) is the corresponding cumulative distribution function. The solution
is
p







One can check that the function is increasing. Hence, the allocation is im-
plementable. Returning to the original variables
x1 = α1(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b))
x2 = α2(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1




α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b)).
44The exclusion region is given by
Ω0 = {α ∈ R
2
+ :1−
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b) ≤ 0}.
It is easy to see that the exclusion region is non-empty, since for small values
of α1 + α2 the ﬁrst term can be neglected, and the second negative term
dominates the third positive term, since eb >b+1for any b ∈ R.I ti sa l s o
interesting to note that all types on the boundary α1 + α2 = b are served
eﬃciently. As b →∞the solution becomes
x1 = α1(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 )
x2 = α2(1 −
α1 + α2 +1




α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 ).
The exclusion region in this case is
Ω0 = {α ∈ R
2






2. Integration Along Rays
45Note that utility is homogeneous of degree one in types and assume that
b = ∞, so Ω = R2
+. Then we can, following Armstrong’s integration along
rays approach, deﬁne a candidate solution as a solution to a pointwise max-










The ﬁrst order conditions are


















texp(−t(α1 + α2))dt =
exp(−α1 − α2)





α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 .
Plugging it into (71)-(73) one obtains
x1 = α1(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 )
x2 = α2(1 −
α1 + α2 +1




α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 ).
This coincides with the solution we obtained by the previous method in the
limit b →∞ . Since we proved that previous method is implementable, this
is a solution to our problem. Note that using this procedure for β 6=1 /2
x1 = α1(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 ) (74)
x2 = α2(1 −
α1 + α2 +1






α1 + α2 +1








α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 ) (77)
∂u
∂α2




α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 ). (78)
It is easy to check that right hand sides of (77)-(78) cannot be components
of the gradient of any function. Hence, allocation (74)-(76) is not imple-
mentable.
3.Hamiltonian Approach
In this approach I will try to go as far as possible assuming an arbitrary
value of β. The envelope conditions for the consumer surplus are





























3)]exp(−α1 − α2) −













The ﬁrst order conditions have the form
λ1 =( x1 − α1)exp(−α1 − α2) (80)

















))exp(α1 + α2)) (82)
divλ =e x p ( −α1 − α2) − η (83)
λ1 + λ2 =0 at α1 + α2 = b (84)
λ1 =0 at α1 =0 (85)
λ2 =0 at α2 =0 . (86)
Note, that since the Hamiltonian is concave in x ﬁrst order conditions are
necessary and suﬃcient for maximum. Hence conditions (80)-(82) capture
the Pontryagin maximum principle. Equation (83) is the evolution equation
for the costate variable. To understand the boundary conditions note that
49the boundary consists of three segments: a segment α1+α2 = b with normal
vector n =( 1 ,1), a segment α1 =0with a normal vector (1,0), and a segment
α2 =0with a normal vector (0,1). Equations (84)-(86) are therefore the
transversality conditions.
Within the participation region η =0 , let us look for a candidate solution
in a form:
λi = αi exp(−α1 − α2)ϕ(α1 + α2),
where ϕ is some continuously diﬀerentiable function. Denote z = α1 + α2.
Then
divλ =e x p ( −α1 − α2) ⇒ zϕ
0 +( 2− z)ϕ =1 .
The condition on the boundary α1+α2 = b implies ϕ(b)=0 , while two other







is a particular solution of this equation. The general solution is a sum of a
50particular solution and the general solution of the uniform equation
zϕ
0 +( 2− z)ϕ =0 .





























The boundary condition ϕ(b)=0implies
C =( b +1 ) e
−b.
51Hence
λi = −αi exp(−α1 − α2)(
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 −
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b)).
Now the ﬁrst two conditions imply that
x1 = α1(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b))
x2 = α2(1 −
α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b)),






α1 + α2 +1
(α1 + α2)2 +
b +1
(α1 + α2)2 exp(α1 + α2 − b)).
But this is exactly allocation (74)-(76), which is implementable if and only
if β =1 /2.
If β 6=1 /2 one can solve for x1,x 2 in terms of the components of the
surplus gradient s1,s 2 to get
x1(α,∇s)=











52Then plug (87)-(88) into (80)-(81) to express components of λ through the
components of surplus gradient. Note that conditions (85)-(86) hold auto-









xi(α,∇s)=b for α1 + α2 = b. (90)
This system (89)-(90) holds in the participation region. This is the von-
Neumann boundary value problem for an elliptic partial diﬀerential equation
for the surplus. The solution to this problem is unique up to an additive
constant, where the constant will determine the participation region. For
β = 1
2 the solution is










dt + C (92)





∗)=0 .( 9 4 )
Using (87)-(88) one can ﬁnd the optimal allocation and show that it is the
same as one derived using two other approaches. Both other approaches
break, however, for β 6=1 /2. The Hamiltonian approach, on the other hand,
is still applicable. In general, system (89)-(90) should be solved numerically.
For β suﬃciently close to 1/2 its solution is implementable.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I applied the Hamiltonian method to solve the relaxed prob-
lem for the multidimensional screening problem. The technique was previ-
ously developed for the case of the utilities linear in types (Basov, 2001).
Together with the implementability results developed by Carlier [2002] this
technique sometimes allows us to arrive at a complete solution of a screening
problem. In the linear case the Hamiltonian approach can be thought of as
a two-step procedure, ﬁrst introduce new quality dimensions, utils, which
54are produced using physical quality dimensions. The number of utils always
equals the dimensionality of the type vector. If dimension of type is bigger
then the number of physical quality characteristics, then this leads to restric-
tions on the utils production. Similar intuition is useful in the nonlinear case.
Utils in this case are, however, type speciﬁc.
The technique developed in this paper was used to solve some examples.
This paper leaves open the question: What is the solution to the screening
problem if the solution to the relaxed problem is not implementable? The
solution to this problem is known only in the linear case and in the case
m = n =1 . For a discussion, see Rochet and Chone [1998]. I hypothesize
that in the general case it should be a monotone rearrangement of the solution
to the relaxed problem with respect to an appropriately chosen measure.
APPENDIX
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :Let z0 ∈ Rn be a vector deﬁned by
z
0
i = zm−n+i (A.1)
if m>nand z0
i = zi otherwise. Deﬁne a normed space:
55H
1(Ω)={φ : φ ∈ L












[v(a,z) − c(z) − s(α)]f(α)dα. (A.4)
Let













0),i = 1,m− n}. (A.5)
I will prove that there exists a unique surplus function s∗ ∈ K and allocation
z∗(·) such that π(s∗) ≥ π(s) for any s ∈ K and z∗
i = ∂v/∂αi(α,z∗0).S i n c e
under assumptions on functions ∂v/∂αi the set K is a convex closed set,
to prove the ﬁrst assertion it is suﬃcient to prove that the functional π is
coercive on K (see, e.g., Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [1980]), i. e. that
π(s) tends to −∞ when |s|H1 tends to +∞.F o ra l ls ∈ H1(Ω),d e n o t eb ys







By the Poincare inequality (see, e.g., Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia [1980])
there exists a constant M(Ω) such that for all s ∈ H1(Ω), |s − s|L2 ≤
M(Ω)|∇s|L2.T h i si m p l i e st h a t
|s|H1 → +∞⇔s → +∞ or |∇s|L2 → +∞ .( A . 7 )
Note that since each vj(·) is concave and vj(0) = 0 one obtains z ≤
h∇v(0),z0i and hence |∇s|L2 ≤ N(Ω)|z0|L2 .Under the assumptions on the
cost and the distribution of types:
π(s) ≤− γε|z|
2
L2 + M(Ω)N(Ω)|z|L2 − s. (A.8)
For the details of derivation of (A.8) see Rochet and Chone [1998]. Note that
since zj ≤ vj(z0) for 1,m− n the condition |∇s|L2 → +∞ implies z0 → +∞.
Coerciveness of π then follows from (A.7) and (A.8).
57Hence, I have proven that π achieves maximum for some s∗ ∈ K.T o
see that z∗
i = ∂v/∂αi(α,z∗0) should hold, assume that there exists k such
that zk <∂ v / ∂ α k(α,z0). Consider a function s0(α)=s∗(α)+δαi − ε for
each α such that s∗(α) >s 0(α) and i = 1,m− n.N o t e t h a t s0 ∈ K for
suﬃciently small δ>0 and ε>0. Since the cost function depends only on
z0,t h ei n t e g r a n di nt h ed e ﬁnition of π increases by ε.I f0 / ∈ Γ,o n ec a nﬁnd
such values of δ and ε such that new participation region is a superset of
the initial one. Otherwise, some points may drop out of the participation
region, but their Lebesque measure will be O(εm). In any case, π(s0) >π (s∗)
for suﬃciently small δ and ε. T h i si m p l i e st h a tz∗
i = ∂v/∂αi(α,z∗0),w h i c h
completes the proof of the existence.
Proof of the uniqueness is exactly the same as in Rochet and Chone [1998].
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